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POLLAK, District Judge. 
     The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 
U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., requires states which accept federal funding 
for the education of disabled children to insure that those 
children receive a "free appropriate public education."  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(a).  The plaintiffs before us in this case   Jeremy Hunter, 
who has a severe visual handicap, his father, W. Eugene Hunter, and 
his mother, Rita Hunter (collectively, "the Hunters")   assert that 
the Mount Lebanon School District and its staff have, over the 
course of many years, failed to provide the "appropriate" 
educational program to which Jeremy Hunter has been entitled.  As 
is required by IDEA, the Hunters initially invoked a Pennsylvania 
administrative procedure established to resolve such claims.  
Dissatisfied, they then filed a complaint in federal district 
court, in which they brought claims under a number of statutes: 
IDEA; the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 
12101 et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 720, 794; and 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  They named as defendants the Mount Lebanon 
School District; eight members of the Mount Lebanon School Board 
(sued both in their official and in their individual capacities); 
and four officials of the Mount Lebanon School District (also sued 
in both their official and their individual capacities).   
     The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, inter 
alia, that the Hunters' IDEA claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations and by the Hunters' failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.  The district court granted this motion as to all of the 
Hunters' claims, and ordered that the complaint be dismissed.  The 
Hunters have appealed.   
 
              I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
     Our recitation of this case's long history is largely derived 
from the allegations in the Hunters' complaint.  The principal 
figure in this history, Jeremy Hunter, was born on September 6, 
1976.  Before he entered kindergarten, he was diagnosed with 
Brown's Syndrome, a vision disorder, in his left eye, and with 
occlusional nystagmus, also a vision disorder, in both eyes.  
Brown's Syndrome apparently renders it difficult to maintain 
binocular vision, which in turn causes "reduced reading rate and 
orientation and mobility problems."  Occlusional nystagmus causes 
fatigue, rendering it difficult for a student to read for long 
periods.  App. at 14-15. 
     In January, 1982, while he was in kindergarten, Jeremy had 
surgery to correct his Brown's Syndrome; this surgery was reported 
(apparently erroneously) to have corrected his problem.  App. at 
14-15.  A year later, Mount Lebanon School District (MLSD) 
determined that Jeremy was eligible to receive special education 
services.  For the next six years, Jeremy received such services 
from vision teachers provided by the School District.  Over this 
period, the School District conducted a series of assessments of 
Jeremy's educational needs; these assessments were termed 
multidisciplinary evaluations, because they included contributions 
from a variety of specialists.  Based on these evaluations, MLSD 
prepared annual individualized education plans, or IEPs, for 
Jeremy. 
     During this six-year period, the complaint states, Jeremy 
experienced difficulty with "reading, completing assignments, and 
orientation and mobility," App. at 108, problems that the Hunters 
aver resulted from the defendants' failure adequately to 
accommodate his disability.  As a result of these difficulties, 
Jeremy had a number of bouts of serious anxiety about school.  In 
the fall of 1989, when Jeremy was about to enter junior high 
school, his parents concluded that his emotional condition required 
that they withdraw him from public school.  The Hunters placed 
their son in private (and later in parochial) school, where, the 
complaint states, he received services that were more appropriate 
to his needs.  The Hunters also hired a number of private vision 
teachers for Jeremy, and helped him with his homework themselves. 
     Jeremy's parents continued to press MLSD to provide Jeremy 
with an appropriate public education.  Accordingly, in late 1990 
and early 1991, the District conducted another multidisciplinary 
evaluation, and prepared another IEP, apparently without providing 
Jeremy's parents with an opportunity to participate in this 
process.  Jeremy's parents were dissatisfied with the composition 
of the team conducting the multidisciplinary evaluation and with 
the evaluation's results, as well as with the results of the IEP, 
and responded by invoking the IDEA administrative dispute- 
resolution procedure. 
     IDEA (1) requires that state educational agencies which 
receive federal assistance establish administrative procedures for 
resolving disputes as to the education of disabled children, and 
(2) provides certain criteria for those procedures.  See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415.  These procedures are intended "to assure that children 
with disabilities and their parents or guardians are guaranteed 
procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of free 
appropriate public education by such agencies and units."  20 
U.S.C. § 1415(a).  IDEA envisions a three-stage dispute-resolution 
process.  The initial stage is a hearing, at which the parties are 
afforded enumerated procedural protections.  See § 1415(b), (d).  
Parties aggrieved by the findings and decision of the hearing 
process may appeal to the state's educational agency.  See 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(c).  Thereafter, IDEA permits an aggrieved party to 
file a civil action.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). 
     In Pennsylvania, the initial, hearing stage of the IDEA 
process is termed a "due process hearing."  The processing of the 
Hunters' complaint began with such a hearing.  The matter was 
assigned to Dr. Constance Fox Lyttle; Dr. Lyttle's inquiry into the 
Hunter grievance consumed nineteen hearing days over the period 
from October 1991 to September 1992.  On February 24, 1993, Dr. 
Lyttle issued a detailed and lengthy report of her findings and 
decision.  Both sides then invoked the IDEA administrative appeals 
procedure, which, in Pennsylvania, takes the form of an appeal to 
the Special Education Due Process Review Panel.  On May 21, 1993, 
the appellate panel issued an opinion that substantially affirmed 
the hearing officer's findings and decision, with certain 
modifications.   
     The following is a summary of the principal elements of the 
hearing officer's findings and decision, and of those conclusions 
of the appellate panel which differed from the conclusions of the 
hearing officer. 
      
     1.  The Hunters had requested reimbursement for evaluations of 
     Jeremy that they had had performed at their own expense.  The 
     hearing officer found that MLSD's multidisciplinary 
     evaluations suffered from a number of major deficiencies, 
     noting, for instance, that MLSD had found that Jeremy had 
     below-normal intelligence on the basis of tests that were not 
     designed for use with children with impaired vision.  
     Accordingly, she ordered that MLSD reimburse the Hunters for 
     evaluations that they had commissioned at their own expense, 
     and that MLSD provide for a number of new evaluations.  App. 
     at 17, 40-44, 64. 
 
     2.  The Hunters asserted that the IEPs prepared by MLSD were 
     vague and inappropriate.  The hearing officer agreed.  App. at 
     44-47.  
 
     3.  The Hunters asserted that MLSD had erred when, during 
     Jeremy's sixth-grade year, it had switched him from a plan 
     under which he received reduced assignments to accommodate his 
     difficulties with reading to a plan under which he received a 
     full assignment load.  The hearing officer agreed, and found 
     that MLSD should prepare a new IEP for Jeremy.  The parties 
     had stipulated to a list of persons to be included on a team 
     charged with preparing such an IEP.  This list included the 
     Hunters' own vision expert, Jeremy's psychologist, Jeremy's 
     parents, and some MLSD personnel.  App. at 39.  The hearing 
     officer's decision provided detailed guidelines for the 
     elements of the IEP, App. at 50-52; the appellate decision 
     eliminated some of these provisions, App. at 96-98, leaving 
     these issues to be decided by the future team.   
 
     4.  The Hunters asked for repayment of the private-school 
     tuition that they had paid.  The hearing officer denied this 
     request, on the grounds that the school Jeremy attended was 
     simply a private school, with no special facilities to 
     accommodate his handicap.  App. at 52-53. 
 
     5.  The hearing officer found that MLSD had not provided 
     Jeremy with the "free appropriate public education" guaranteed 
     to him by IDEA.  Accordingly, she ordered that MLSD provide 
     compensatory education, in the form of special sessions during 
     the school year and a four-week summer program.  App. at 53- 
     54.  The appellate panel found that these services should be 
     provided for two years, or until Jeremy graduated from high 
     school.  App. at 96. 
 
     6.  The Hunters sought reimbursement for psychological and 
     vision training that they had paid for while Jeremy attended 
     MLSD public schools.  The hearing officer found that the 
     latter services should be reimbursed, but not the former.  
     App. at 55-56. 
 
     7.  The Hunters sought reimbursement for a wide range of 
     services that they had paid for while Jeremy attended private 
     schools.  The hearing officer disallowed some psychological 
     and vision counseling, allowed a vision-related summer program 
     and specialist, allowed expenses for vision-related equipment, 
     and disallowed compensation for the time of Jeremy's parents.  
     App. at 56-60. 
 
The hearing officer also rejected a number of theories under which 
MLSD sought to contest the Hunters' claims, including a claim that 
they were barred by the statute of limitations since much of the 
conduct at issue had occurred many years earlier.  App. at 60-62. 
     For reasons that are not made fully clear in the Hunters' 
complaint, much or all of the foregoing order was never 
implemented; in particular, no new evaluations were conducted, no 
new IEP was prepared, and Jeremy's compensatory education never 
materialized.  (The Hunters' complaint refers to MLSD's "failure to 
allow another agency to assume responsibility for 
evaluation/programming when requested by the parents," App. at 114, 
suggesting that this may have been one area of disagreement.)  
After the appellate decision was issued, Jeremy and his father 
apparently established residency in Ohio, as a result of which the 
state of Ohio placed Jeremy at the Ohio State School for the Blind 
during the 1993-94 school year.  This placement, although helpful, 
was apparently a lonely one for Jeremy, and in the summer of 1994 
he and his father returned to Pennsylvania. 
     On November 17, 1994, the Hunters filed their complaint in 
this suit.  Their complaint made claims based, on the foregoing 
events, under IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and section 
1983.  In their prayer for relief, they asked that the court: 
  
     1.  Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Mount Lebanon School 
     District to comply with the requirements of IDEA, ADA and § 
     504 of the Rehabilitation Act by arranging for free 
     appropriate public education be provided [sic] to Jeremy 
     Hunter by a local educational agency other than Mount Lebanon 
     School District that is capable of undertaking the 
     responsibility to properly evaluate Jeremy Hunter and develop, 
     in cooperation with Jeremy and his parents, an individual 
     education plan and to deliver to Jeremy the education and 
     supplementary services required for him to benefit from his 
     education and achieve his educational potential. 
 
     2.  Award plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages. 
      
App. at 122. 
     The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the Hunters' 
complaint for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, to 
have the court order a more specific pleading.  The motion cited 
nine grounds for dismissal, one of which was that the Hunters' IDEA 
claims were barred by the statute of limitations and by failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies.   
     On May 30, 1995, in a brief memorandum, the district court 
dismissed all of the Hunters' claims.   The district court began by 
noting that section 1983 creates no substantive rights, and that 
the court would therefore focus on the underlying statutory claims.  
As to the Hunters' IDEA claims, the district court found that a 
two-year statute of limitations applied.  The Hunters' complaint 
was filed on November 17, 1994; thus, the district court found that 
the plaintiffs were "entitled to recover only for alleged IDEA 
violations that occurred after November 17, 1992."  Because the 
only administrative proceeding brought by the Hunters was initiated 
in October, 1991, the court found that the Hunters had not 
exhausted their administrative remedies as to post-November 17, 
1992 events.  Finally, the court found that the Hunters were barred 
from pursuing their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims because they 
had not exhausted the administrative remedies provided by Title 
VII. 
     On appeal, the Hunters assert that these findings were error.  
We have jurisdiction over the Hunters' appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Our review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is plenary.  
SeeScattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir. 1991).  
     In Part II of this opinion we address the statutory bases of 
the Hunters' claims.  First, we will outline the relevant 
provisions of IDEA, of the ADA, and of the Rehabilitation Act.  
Then we will discuss the Hunters' section 1983 claim, which, we 
conclude, does have substantive content.  In Part III of this 
opinion we address the statute of limitations aspect of the 
Hunters' IDEA claims.  Finally, in Part IV, we address questions of 
exhaustion. 
 
         II.  THE STATUTORY BASIS OF THE HUNTERS' CLAIMS 
A.  The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
     As we have already noted, IDEA guarantees that all disabled 
children in states accepting federal funding for education for the 
disabled will receive a "free appropriate public education."  20 
U.S.C. § 1415(a).  IDEA also, as we have indicated, provides a 
procedure that allows disabled children and their parents to 
enforce this guarantee.   
     As the final stage of this enforcement procedure, IDEA permits 
"any party aggrieved by the findings and decision" of the state 
appellate procedure to "bring a civil action with respect to the 
complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be 
brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a 
district court of the United States without regard to the amount in 
controversy."  20 U.S.C. § 1415 (e)(2).  IDEA further provides 
that, in such an action, "the court shall receive the records of 
the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at 
the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the 
preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court 
determines is appropriate."  20 U.S.C. § 1415 (e)(2). 
     In part, the Hunters' complaint seeks to contest adverse 
decisions by the state hearing officer and the appellate panel.  
To the extent that this is the relief that the Hunters seek, their 
complaint would seem to be properly brought under § 1415(e)(2).  
However, the Hunters' complaint also apparently seeks in part to 
enforce elements of the decision of the state administrative 
process.  There may be some question whether this aspect of the 
complaint can properly be pursued under § 1415(e)(2); but the 
question is not one we need to resolve in the context of this case, 
since, as we note hereafter (see infra, typescript at 16-17), 
section 1983 (42 U.S.C. § 1983) provides an adequate vehicle for a 
suit to enforce an IDEA administrative decision. 
 
B.  The Rehabilitation Act 
     IDEA sets forth a positive right to a "free appropriate public 
education."  By contrast, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 
U.S.C § 794, also invoked by the Hunters, is cast in negative 
terms, barring all federally funded entities (governmental or 
otherwise) from discriminating on the basis of disability.  SeeW.B. v. 
Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 1995).  Section 504 
states, in relevant part: 
 
          No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in 
          the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of his or 
          her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be 
          denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
          under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
          assistance or under any program or activity conducted by 
          any Executive agency or by the United States Postal 
          Service. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 794 (a).  We noted in Matula that, as this portion of 
the Rehabilitation Act has been interpreted, "[t]here appear to be 
few differences, if any, between IDEA's affirmative duty and § 
504's negative prohibition."  67 F.3d at 492-93.  We also found in 
Matula that both injunctive relief and monetary damages are 
available under section 504.  See Matula, 67 F.3d at 494. 
 
C.  The Americans with Disabilities Act 
     The Hunters do not cite a specific provision of the ADA in 
their complaint.  We will assume, however, that it was their 
intention to rely upon 42 U.S.C. § 12132, which extends the 
nondiscrimination rule of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to 
services provided by any "public entity" (without regard to whether 
the entity is a recipient of federal funds).  See Helen L. v. 
DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331-32 (3d Cir. 1995).  Section 12132 states: 
 
          Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no 
          qualified individual with a disability shall by reason of 
          such disability be excluded from participation in or be 
          denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
          activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
          discrimination by any such entity. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1995).  Under 42 U.S.C. § 12133, "the remedies, 
procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of Title 29 shall 
be the remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to 
any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in 
violation of section 12132 of this title."  42 U.S.C. § 12133 
(1995).  29 U.S.C. § 794a is the provision that governs remedies 
for violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  Because 
we held in Matula that this provision permitted claims for monetary 
damages, see 67 F.3d at 494, it follows that those claims are also 
permitted under the ADA. 
 
D.   Section 1983 
     Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for acts taken under 
color of law that deprive "any citizen of the United States or 
person within the jurisdiction thereof" of "rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."   42 U.S.C. § 
1983.  Not infrequently, section 1983 (1) provides redress for 
violations of federal laws that do not by their own terms create a 
cause of action, or (2) provides remedies not available directly 
under those laws.   
     In the present case, whether or not an IDEA decision of a 
state hearing officer or appellate body is enforceable under IDEA 
directly, such a decision would seem to be enforceable under 
section 1983.  The Fourth Circuit found, in Robinson v. 
Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1987), that a section 1983 
action could be brought to enforce the decision of an IDEA 
administrative proceeding.  We agree with the reasoning of 
Pinderhughes, and note that the Supreme Court's present methodology 
for ascertaining whether a section 1983 action is available to 
redress a violation of federal law produces the same result. 
      
                 III.  THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
     In Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, 665 F.2d 443 (3d 
Cir. 1981), this court found, drawing on Pennsylvania law, that 
either a two-year or a six-year limitations period applied to the 
filing of IDEA actions.  We did not then have occasion to decide 
between these two periods, although we suggested that a two-year 
period might be appropriate.  See id. at 454-55. 
     The district court, citing Tokarcik, applied a two-year 
limitations period to the plaintiffs' IDEA claims.  It stated that 
the plaintiffs had filed their action on November 17, 1994, and 
that they therefore could not recover for any alleged IDEA 
violations that had occurred before November 17, 1992   in other 
words, for virtually all of the events at issue in their complaint. 
     We find that the district court's application of the 
limitations period in this manner was error.  IDEA requires that a 
plaintiff exhaust state administrative remedies before initiating 
a civil suit.  In the present case, that process took some eighteen 
months, from October 1991 to May 1993.  (Indeed, the Hunters 
apparently first requested a due process hearing in February 1991, 
over two years before the appellate panel issued its decision in 
May 1993.)  As it was applied by the district court, the 
limitations period could, in combination with the exhaustion 
requirement, operate to deprive a plaintiff of much or all relief 
under IDEA. 
     There remains the question   not explicitly answered by 
Tokarcik   of how the statute of limitations is to be applied.  
There would appear to be two principal alternatives: (1) that the 
period begins when the acts complained of occur (and is tolled 
while exhaustion occurs), and (2) that the period begins once the 
state administrative process has run its course.  The first 
approach has many flaws; for instance, it requires a complex 
tolling analysis, and allows different plaintiffs widely varying 
(and perhaps difficult-to-ascertain) periods in which they may 
bring suit.  It might therefore interfere with the statutory policy 
  cited by Tokarcik in declining to apply a thirty-day limitations 
period   of allowing parents ample time to work together with 
school authorities in evaluating and implementing administrative 
decisions, and then, if necessary, to prepare an appeal.  SeeTokarcik, 665 
F.2d at 451-53 (1981).  Accordingly, we find that 
the second approach is preferable, that the limitations period for 
the initiation of the present action therefore only began to run 
once the appellate panel issued its decision, on May 21, 1993, and 
that all of the Hunters' claims now before this court were 
therefore timely brought.   
 
                         IV.  EXHAUSTION 
     IDEA requires, in section 1415(e)(2), that an aggrieved party 
must invoke a state's administrative procedures before bringing an 
IDEA claim in state or federal court.  Section 1415(f) of IDEA  
adds to this the requirement that, before bringing claims under 
other statutes that "seek[] relief that is also available under 
this subchapter," the administrative procedures set forth in 
section 1415 "shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be 
required had the action been brought under this subchapter."  20 
U.S.C. § 1415(f).  This provision bars plaintiffs from 
circumventing IDEA's exhaustion requirement by taking claims that 
could have been brought under IDEA and repackaging them as claims 
under some other statute   e.g., section 1983, section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, or the ADA.  See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 
495-96 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing the legislative history of § 1415(f) 
as stating that "parents alleging violations of section 504 [of the 
Rehabilitation Act] and 42 U.S.C. 1983 are required to exhaust 
administrative remedies before commencing separate actions in court 
where exhaustion would be required under [IDEA].") (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 99-296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985)); Hope v. Cortines, 
69 F.3d 687, 688 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that exhaustion is 
required as to ADA claims). 
     After finding that the statute of limitations barred all of 
the Hunters' IDEA claims based on events occurring before November 
17, 1992, the district court went on to conclude that all of their 
claims based upon events occurring after that date were barred for 
failure to comply with IDEA's exhaustion requirement, as the only 
administrative proceeding that the Hunters had initiated began much 
earlier, in October 1991.  The district court also, citing Spence 
v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1995), held that the plaintiffs 
were required to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 before bringing their ADA 
and Rehabilitation Act claims, and that the plaintiffs' failure to 
do so barred those claims.  We will begin by considering the latter 
holding.   
 
A.  Exhaustion under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. 
     The exhaustion rule applied in Spence was the result of what 
we termed an "incongruent enforcement scheme."  54 F.3d 196, 199 
(3d Cir. 1995).  The Rehabilitation Act provides two avenues by 
which a plaintiff may sue to redress employment discrimination.  
The Act contains a provision, section 501, directed specifically at 
employment discrimination.  See 29 U.S.C. § 794.  Violations of 
this provision may be redressed through section 505(a)(1), which 
permits plaintiffs to invoke "[t]he remedies, procedures and 
rights" set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1).  Title VII's exhaustion requirement  
therefore applies to plaintiffs suing under section 501.  The Act 
also, however, has a general provision, section 504, which bars 
discrimination against the disabled (including employment 
discrimination) in all federally-funded programs.  Violations of 
section 504 may be redressed through section 505(a)(2), which 
permits plaintiffs to invoke "[t]he remedies, procedures and 
rights" not of Title VII, but of Title VI, a title which includes 
no exhaustion requirement.  29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2).  Although this 
structure created the appearance that a plaintiff might be able to 
circumvent the exhaustion requirement applicable to section 501 
through the simple expedient of suing under section 504, in Spencewe found 
that it was appropriate to conclude that Congress intended 
to require that a plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination 
claim under either section 501 or section 504 first exhaust her 
administrative remedies.  See Spence, 54 F.3d at 199-202.   
     Spence involved very unusual circumstances, which do not 
obtain here.  The provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and of the 
ADA invoked by the Hunters are not, by the terms of those two 
statutes, subject to any exhaustion requirements.  Nor do the 
Hunters' claims have the effect of circumventing some other 
Congressionally-mandated exhaustion requirement.  Indeed, the only 
related exhaustion requirement imposed by Congress is IDEA's 
requirement, in section 1415(f), that a party who brings a claim 
that seeks relief also available under IDEA must first exhaust 
IDEA's administrative remedies.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).  This the 
Hunters have done with respect to their ADA and Rehabilitation Act 
claims, by following the elaborate route of a "due process" hearing 
and review by an appellate panel.  In the absence of any 
incongruity in the IDEA scheme, there is no need to impose any 
further exhaustion requirement.   
   
B.  Exhaustion under IDEA 
     As we have just pointed out, the Hunters have, with respect to 
their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, exhausted IDEA's 
administrative remedies.  But the Hunters have also advanced two 
other groups of claims which call for a somewhat more extended 
exhaustion analysis.  These are: (1) their effort to enforce the 
decision of the state administrative process, and (2) what appears 
to be an effort to raise claims that they did not raise in the 
state administrative process. 
 
1.  Efforts to enforce the decision of the state proceeding.  The 
defendants argue that the Hunters' effort to enforce the decision 
of the state administrative proceeding is subject to a specialized 
exhaustion requirement.  They assert that claims of this type must 
be exhausted through a "Complaint Management System" established by 
Pennsylvania's Bureau of Special Education, an administrative 
procedure distinct from the "due process hearing" procedure 
discussed above.   
     The defendants have furnished the court with a general 
description of this "Complaint Management System," but with no 
documentation as to its specific elements or legal basis.  The 
defendants' description suffices, however, to persuade us that the 
system to which they refer is the system established by the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to implement a set of federal 
regulations that require that state educational agencies establish 
procedures for receiving and resolving complaints relating to IDEA 
implementation.  See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.660-300.662.  These 
regulations establish minimum procedures that state agencies must 
follow in resolving complaints, requiring, for instance, that 
agencies carry out an investigation and issue a written decision 
containing findings of fact, conclusions, and, if necessary, 
corrective actions to achieve compliance.  See 34 C.F.R. § 300.661. 
Complainants are also provided the right to appeal adverse 
decisions to the Secretary of the United States Department of 
Education.  See 34 C.F.R. § 300.661. 
     The Ninth Circuit, in Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Dist., 
967 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1992), suggested in dicta that a plaintiff 
could, as to certain types of claims, be required to exhaust the 
Education Department General Administrative Regulations (or EDGAR) 
procedures, a regulatory forerunner of the present sections 
300.660-300.662.  See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1307-08.  The Hoeft court 
noted that this process might serve as an alternative exhaustion 
mechanism to IDEA's own administrative procedures in certain cases, 
concluding that "[w]hether to require or to accept exhaustion of 
the EDGAR procedure as a substitute for exhausting IDEA procedures 
in challenges to facially invalid policies, however, is a 
determination which must be made on a case-by-case basis." 967 F.2d 
at 1308.  Hoeft did not, however, cite any legal authority, either 
in the EDGAR regulations or in the text of IDEA, under which a 
court might require exhaustion of EDGAR procedures.  Nor can we 
discern any such authority, either as to the previous EDGAR 
procedures or as to the present §§ 300.660-300.662.  Indeed, the 
text of §§ 300.660-300.662, and the various statements made in the 
Federal Register as they took their present shape, both evince an 
expectation that invocation of the complaint procedures they 
establish will be elective, not mandatory.   
 
2.  Claims not raised in the state proceeding.  As to events that 
occurred after the conclusion of the state administrative 
proceeding, the Hunters have, of course, had no opportunity to 
exhaust their administrative remedies.  For this reason, the 
district court dismissed all of the Hunters' claims based on such 
events.  The district court also stated that it was "not persuaded 
by plaintiffs' conclusionary averment that their pursuit of 
administrative remedies would be a futile gesture."  The Hunters 
appeal this ruling.   
     The district court did not provide a detailed listing of which 
elements of the Hunters' complaint it was dismissing on this 
ground.  However, an examination of the complaint reveals that the 
only event which it describes that occurred after the termination 
of the administrative proceeding was Eugene and Jeremy Hunter's 
temporary move to Ohio in order to enroll Jeremy in a public school 
for the disabled.  This claim raises a number of important policy 
questions, such as when it is appropriate for a state to pay the 
costs of moving one of its citizens to another state in order to 
receive public benefits there.  We therefore agree with the 
district court that this claim should be exhausted. 
     Finally, it appears that one element of the Hunters' 
complaint, the Hunters' request that MLSD not be involved in 
evaluations or programming for Jeremy, was not raised in the state 
proceeding.  The state appellate panel specifically rejected a 
request by the Hunters that MLSD not perform evaluation and 
programming, on the ground that this issue had not been raised 
before the hearing officer.  App. at 99.  Assuming that the 
appellate panel's finding was correct, we find that it would be 
appropriate for this claim to be exhausted before it is examined in 
the district court. 
     We reach this conclusion with some reluctance, as it could 
entail further delay in an already much-delayed case.  However, the 
issue of MLSD's involvement in evaluation and programming for 
Jeremy seems to be central to the Hunters' complaint.  Accordingly, 
the administrative process should be allowed an opportunity to 
address that central issue.  A principal purpose of IDEA's 
administrative procedure is to permit "state and local education 
agencies[,] in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the 
child," to take "primary responsibility for formulating the 
education to be accorded a handicapped child," Board of Education 
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982); thus, we find that it is 
appropriate to permit the Commonwealth to address this issue before 
it is considered in the district court.  We also note that the 
IDEA hearing and appeal process currently includes strict time 
limits, and that the entire exhaustion process should take no 
longer than a few months if these limits are observed.  See 34 
C.F.R. § 300.512 (1995). 
 
                         V.  CONCLUSION   
     In conclusion, then, we find that:  
     (1) The Hunters' section 1983 claim does have substantive 
content, as it can form the basis of a claim for damages, and as 
section 1983 is an instrument by which the Hunters may compel MLSD 
to comply with a decision of the state administrative process. 
     (2) Because the IDEA statute of limitations does not begin to 
run until the termination of the state administrative proceedings, 
the Hunters' IDEA claims were timely brought. 
     (3) The Hunters need not exhaust Title VII administrative 
remedies as to their ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims. 
     (4) The Hunters need not exhaust the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania's "Complaint Management System." 
     (5) The Hunters must exhaust their claims based upon Eugene 
and Jeremy Hunter's move to Ohio. 
     (6) Assuming that the Hunters did not raise their claims 
relating to the involvement of MLSD in Jeremy's evaluation and 
programming in the state administrative proceedings, they must 
exhaust those claims before they may raise them in the district 
court. 
     We will therefore reverse the district court's order 
dismissing the Hunters' complaint, and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
